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SPACE, TIME, AND SCALE 
A basic archaeological assumption is that temporal change is reflected in spatial change. Whether 
stylistic (as in the decoraticln of a bowl), or statistical and physical (measures of the spatial relationships in a 
site's accumulated deposits), archaeological evidence invariably has a spatial component. From spatial 
evidence temporal continuity and change are inferred. 
If archaeologists wish to examine the mechanisms of cultural change, rather than simply providing 
descriptions nf spatial and temporal variation in material culture. they must address the question of how cultural 
change is encoded in and inferred from spatial discontinuity. Fundamental to this efiort are analyses conducted 
simultaneously at muitipie scales (for an expanded discussion see Marquardt and Crumley 1987). 
Scale refers to the "grain" of the unit of analysis relative to the matrix as a whole; effective scale 
(Crumley 1979:164-65) is any scale at which pattem may be recognized and meaning inferred. For many years 
archaeology was dominared by research at ihe scale of the site, paralleling a focus in anthropology on 
community. In the second haif of the twentieth century, an emphasis on the individual and on context rendered 
legible severa1 more scales, ranging from regional settlement patterns to sub-site activity areas (Willey 1953; 
Binford and Binford 1968: Hil1 and Gunn 1977). 
Subsequent developrrients link concepts and techr~iques that allow the recovery of cartain cognitive 
aspects oí' vanished societies, such as the role of history and o i  cultural preierence in adaptive strategies 
(Crumley 1993; McGovern 1994) or the recovery of aspects of landscape symbolism in vanished belief systems 
(Ashmore and Knapp 1996). In addition, increasingly sophisticated techniques for extracting more traditional 
economic, social, political, and environmental information have become available. 
Particularly fruitiul for the analysis of vanished polities has been long term regional-scale analysis. With 
the passage of time a polity, or its administrative successor(s) in a region. re-ranks the importance of that 
region's resources. These tluctuating boundaries. priorities, and perceptions necessitate a dynamic definition of 
region in which, like any artifact, its forrn and content is transformed over time. 
Even regions that at one scale are ostensibly homogeneous nonetheless have distinctive cultural and 
physical features, both within the area and overlapping into other contiguous areas; manifest at greater or lesser 
scales, these features harbor contradictions with the potential to negate any claim of uniformity. Thus the 
analysis o i  regions and their political, social, and environmental boundaries and other divisions must be 
undertaken at severa1 temporal and spatial scales. 
The concept of lanrlscape. the spatial manifestation of the relations between human groups and their 
environments, is particularly useful to archaeologists. Landscapes offer a framework within which 
contemporaneous sites and olher zones oC activity can be irrtegrated with features of the physical erivirorimerrt 
(Crumley 1976:7; Marquardt and Crumley 19875; Crumley and Marquardt 1990). 
A landscape signature (ibid. 1987:7) is the material record, manifest in both physical and sociohistorical 
structures, of the human activities that characterize a particular time and place. From its signature, priorities, 
choices, and the interna1 dynamics and external relationships of a politp's administrative and political system 
rnay be inierred. Thus the concepts of region and landscape. in their transformation across time and space, and 
in their multiple meanings to those within and beyond fluctuating borders and divisions, are powerful tools for 
the study of pre- and prcto-historic polities. 
These integrated regional- and continental-scale data oiier new insights when applied to the 
topographical realities of the European countryside, and many factors in the decision-making process are 
clarified. The interpretative utility of this body of information, especially as it regards Gaulish polities, is 
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augmented by excellent research on [he patronclient relation (e,g., Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Kaufman 
1974; Michie 1981; Powell 1970; Schmidt e t  al. 1977; Silverman 1965; Tarrow 1966; Weingrod 1968; Wolf 
1966) and on party-based patronage, both in Gaul and at Rome. 
Below I identify decision-making priorities as they pertain to the collective conduct of the various 
Gaulish polities and Rome and to the individual conduct of Celts and Romans. Focus is on the Celtic Aeduii, a 
Gaulish polity located in what is now Burgundy (Francel, and which I have argued is by any definitiol1 a siate 
(Crumley 1974, 1995a). 
Using textual evidence to begin [he analysis, I identify geo- and sociopolitical factors of major 
importance (priorities) during the period in question, and explore the ways in which the particularities 0f 
topography affected the ranking of those factors uppermost in the minds of the Celtic Aedui and Romans in the 
- - 
la& few centuries B.C. 
It can be argued that several important features of the sociopolitical organization of certain preconquest 
Gaulish polities and Republican Rome were essentially similar. The following discussion compares these twO 
structured systems in terms of shared, historically specific dynamic tendencies in political economy. Because 
topography (through definition of boundarles, and defense) records decisions in predominantly political and 
economic terms, the scale at which topography affects human affairs serves as an accurate indicator of systemic 
change (dynamic tendencies). 
The resultant anthropologicai analysis supports generalizing comments about the structural development 
of a ubiquitous element in European society, the patron-client relation. 
GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN GAUL ON THE EVE OF THE CONQUEST 
By the time of Herodotus (ca. 484-424 B.C.) the Greeks recognized the Celts as a major barbarian people 
living west and north of the Mediterranean and beyond the Alps. By the first century B.C., the boundaries of 
Celtic Gaul were well defined (conforming almost exactly to those of modern France), and (according to 
classical authors) the inhabitants distinguished themselves both from the Germans east of the Rhine and the 
Celtiberians south of the Pyrenees (cf. Wells 1997). As Caesar reports in De Bello Gullico, they also 
distinguished themselves internally as named ethnic polities. 
While the geography of Gaul at the time of the Roman conquest is of enduring interest (Blanchet 1931; 
Desjardins 1885; Holmes 1911; Jullian 1908; Longnon 1885; and many others), two scales of inquiry have 
predominat&: local (the battle, encampment, or line of march): and all-inclusive, the latter treating the many 
Gaulish polities as if their altercalions were merely a prirrtitive prelude to the Roman Pax. Only rarely (e.g., 
Büchsenschiitz 1984; Crumley and Marquardt 1987; Goudineau and Peyre 1993) has a single polity--its territory, 
economy, and relations with other polities and with Rome--been the subject of investigation. 
De Bel10 Gallico (BC) ,  Julius Caesar's account of his six-year campaign (58-52 B.C.) in northwest 
Europe, is, however, full of information about named Gaulish polities and interpolity enmities and alliances. 
Caesar, correctly or not, also distinguishes among Roman, Celtic, and German machinations. While Caesar and 
other classical writers always pose interpretive difficulties (Christ 1995; Crumley 1974; Dobesch 1989; Dunham 
1995; Rambaud 1953; Timpe 1986, 1989; Wells 1997), they also offer priceless information. 
Geologically, France is the portion of the European continent most marked by successive periods of 
mountain-building. Bounded on the east by the Alps and on the south by the somewhat older Pyrenees, the 
interior exhibits an even older orogeny in the w e ~ t c e n t r a i  region (the Massif Central) that dominates the 
geology of one-sixth the total area of France. 
AS a result, the topography of France presents a diverse program of deep gorges, rugged pinnaeles, 
windswept plains and coastlines, and gently rolling hills and valleys--frequently within sight of one another. IB 
abundant rivers drain the heights and flow into the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the English Channel, and the 
North Sea. Its climate is predominantly temperate, although oceanic. continental, and Mediterranean weather 
patterns dominate in certain seasons or certain years (Crumley 1987a. 1993, 1994). One finds juxtaposed every 
type of soil, from windblown Pleistocene loess to granite and limestone-based soils. 
The major natural resources of Gaul were the direct result of this geologically and topographically 
heterogeneous landscape. Mountain-building activity insures the presence of a variety of metals (gold, silver, 
iron, and tin, among many others). The combination of fortuitous climate and soils offers a nearly infinite 
variety of agricultura1 milieux. Finally, and perhaps most important, Gaul's geographic situation in western 
Europe assured the importance of any group or groups that could control its pons, its rivers, and its 
At the time of Herodotus, Celtic peopies spanned the length of every major western European trade route, 
namely the coastal route between Italy and Spain. the Aquitanian Gap passage from the French L~~~~~ to the 
Atlantic via the Garonne River, and the corridor d o n g  the Rhdne and Sabne rivers. The third of these was 
particularly important: it connected with the Loire River by a short, easy overland route and thence to the 
Atlantic; it marked the end of the major east-west pass across the Alps (at Geneva); and it gave onto the Belfort 
Gap and Meuse and Moselle rivers, and thence to the entire Rhine basin. Moreover, the source of the Seine, not 
far from the upper Sabne and reached by an easy upland crossing, gave access to the north coast and Britain. In 
short, the whole of western Europe was laid open to commerce as a result of the accommodating topography of 
Gaul. 
There was an intimate relationship between the boundaries of Gaulish polities and the means of 
livelihood of their inhabitants. A long-established European pattern of mixed agriculture and husbandry (Hubert 
1934; Crumley 1994) would have been practiced in the more heterogeneous landscapes, and both intensive 
agriculture and exclusive cattle-, horse-, and sheep-raising in the more homogeneous river valleys and upland 
peneplains. Other aspects of the topography would have received particular attention, among them defensible 
high places, navigable stretches of rivers and river fords, springs (particularly the sources of major rivers), and 
mountain passes. A single polity controlled most such places for its exclusive religious, commercial, and 
administrative use. However, some strategic spots were situated at the boundary of ofie polity with another. The 
Loire, for instance, marked the boundary between the Aedui and the Bituriges Cubi; the Sabne, the boundary 
between the Aedui and the Sequani. In the first instance, the Bituriges were clients of the Aedui, and their 
compliance was assured by hostages and mutual interests. But the boundary between the Aedui and the Sequani 
was disputed, its history marked by armed conflict. 
More commonly, high ridges, swamps, forests, and other inhospitable terrain marked polity boundaries 
(see Jullian 1909:2:26ff.). In general it rnay be supposed that the central fortified town of a Gaulish polity was 
situated well within its boundaries, while its commercial towns were situated along major routes of passage and 
protected by armed garrisons. Bvth types of settlement were critical to the continued prosperity of the polity as a 
whole and, as such, were considerations foremost in the minds of the polity's leaders. 
The very nature of an overland trade route or navigable river is here at issue: such places serve 
simultaneously as  edge and center. A boundary at a river not only divides two territories and serves to limit 
them both, but centralizes interaction between them and in turn links both territories to areas up- and down- 
stream. Cities at such boundaries serve the same function: they aggregate, integrate, and arbitrate varieties of 
custom and opinion. It rnay thus be said that boundaries and centers are similar in that they have simultaneously 
agglomerative and disagglomerative functions (Marquardt and Crumley 1987). 
Inevitably, the presence of a desirable resource at the boundary of two or niore polities would have led to 
disputes concerning utilization, exploitation, and taxation. Multiple claims of that nature may be adjudicated in 
four ways. First, the polities involved rnay mutually exploit the resource through treaty. Second, a powerful 
polity rnay simply usurp the right from a less powerful neighbor by force. Third, two equally powerful polities 
rnay dispute the holding for years, periodically exchanging control by force. Fourth, a more powerful polity rnay 
become the patron of a less powerful group, at which time control of the disputed resource rnay be left in the 
hands of the client, and taxes paid to the patron; or the client rnay be reimbursed as an employee for managing 
the resource or compensated in some other manner (perhaps protection from a mutual enemy). 
It has been noted quite frequently that the boundaries of Gaulish polities are difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine. I would argue that this is due to frequent renegotiatlon (friendly or not) of interpolity boundaries as 
each group's fortunes fluctuated. Such renegotiations rnay represent necessary adjustments subsequent to 
marriage alliances, friendly agreements between entrepreneurs of differing resources who decided to consolidate 
their interests and holdings, and changes in ownership through inheritance, bankruptcy, and the like. Such 
changes in control were tied to the variable fortunes of individuals and of groups. 
An excellent example of the effects of individual control of such a boundary resource is found in Caesar 
(BG 1.18). The Aeduan Dumnorix was said to have bought the right to collect Sabne River tolls and all other 
Aeduan taxes at a low price, "for no one dared oppose his bid." Diviciacus, elder brother of Dumnorix and a 
trusted Roman ally, complained to Caesar (1.20) that he had lent certain of his resources and his "strength" 
(probably some of his clients, that is, cavalry and the like) so that Dumnorix could establish himself. 
Now Dumnorix insisted on challenging Diviciacus for control of the Aedui, the two brothers having found 
themselves allied with opposing pro-Gaulish and pro-Roman factions. That no one dared oppose Dumnorix' bid 
was perhaps partially due to his punitive powers; but perhaps also (and more importantly) his countrymen saw 
the advantage of a powerful, pro-Gaulish patron at the limits of their polity. 
As for polities that control parts of the same trade route, it is clearly to their common advantage. along 
the route's length, to  maintain (1) a moderate level of taxation so as not to send commerce elsewhere, and (2) 
reasonable access to would-be users. An example of such an agreement was that between the Segusiavi (upper 
Loire), the Ambarri (RhGne-Loire overland connection at MBcon), the Aedui (upper-middle Loire), the Bituriges 
Cubi (middle Loire), and the Mandubii (overland routes in central Gaul). 
The Segusiavi, the Ambam, and the Bituriges Cubi were clients of the Aedui, the most powerful of the 
f o u  and most able to maintain free trade and general security for the entire region. In retum, the Ambarri, 
Segusiavi, Bituriges Cubi, and other Aeduan clients served in the Aeduan military and probably paid .~ome of 
the taxes collected by Dumnorix and mentioned in Caesar (BG 1.18). 
From the above, we may deduce the more obvious sources of wealth in Gaulish polities, most particularly 
those involved in long-distance trade with 0 t h  policies or with Meditenanean entrepreneurs. Caesar (BG 1.1, 
39; 3.1; 8.3,42, 55) notes numerous instances of the latter deep in the interior of Gaul. The sources of wealth 
were taxation of commerce, commerce itseif (import and/or export of both raw materials and finished products), 
and production for commercial enterprise. 
Table 1 
A E D U A N  G E O E C O N O M Y  O N  THE EVE OF 1'HE CONQUEST 
Sources uf wcalth Related resources Geograpliical location 
Tnxolror~ I?/ cur~rrrrcn.e control of passage at fords, passes, fords, etc. 
passes, brcak-~n-bulk 
points, Ieg~tirnacy 
Irrl}wrl ~ r r r t l  c~kl)rlrl o/ cr~rrrrr~cr~c brokcrage rclations; stur- nudcs in transportation 
(intra- and intcrpol~ty and agclbreak-ili-bulk facilities nctwork 
international) 
Cor~rr~rercral producltort 
stockbreeding 
horses access to excellent grazing lush valleys 
land 
cattle access to good graLlng land uplands, rolling hills 
sheep access to poor g r a ~ i n g  land highlands 
pigs acccss to land for piglots corrals i n  forests 
rnelal-rnin~ng opcratlons acccss to nilncs Morvan liiglilands 
artisanal activit~es relations with artlsans andlor artisans' quarters, as at Ux- 
brokers as a patron, access ellodunum or Bibracte 
to rnater~als as practiclng 
artisan 
agr~cultursl production access to good farrnland rlver valleys, ro l l~ng  Ilills, 
uplands 
Prulccl iurl cavalrymen (arrned rncn and 
t l ic~r  llorses) 
defens~ble places hillfurts, other fortifications 
weapons 
brokerage relations (cornmer- 
cial, IcgaI, social, etc.) 
Production might take a variety of forms: stock-breeding (cattle, sheep, and perhaps horses), control of 
metal-mining operations (BG 3.21; 7.22), control of artisans who turned raw materials into finished products (as 
with the patrons of Uxellodunum, BG 8.32, and Bibracte), and possibly larger agricultura1 ventures (either 
through control of large holdings or through ~00perative and/or ~0erc ive  control of individual farmers' smaller 
holdings). 
This last possible source of wealth is problematical, as it hinges on questions of inheritance and land 
tenure (sec below); but Caesar notes that in some supposedly friendly territories "the people" could nat be made 
to deliver grain to his armies, which implies that farmers were in control of their own produce (BG 1.16). 
Finally, the most obvious source of wealth, as a careful reading of De Bello Gallico indicates, was 
protection. Whether it was against another polity, Or against factions within a polity, patrons offered their 
clients physical protection from invaders and marauders as well as less tangible intercession on behalf of clients 
in disputes of administrative or personal nature. These sources of Gaulish wealth were protected by capital 
investment in specific resources, which in tum may be linked with some certainty to the physical geography of 
Gaul. Table 1 relates sources of wealth and resources in the territory controlled by the Aedui. 
The taxation of commerce (cf. BG 1.20) requires the armed control of mountain passes, river for&, and 
commercial break-in-bulk points, t h ~ s  necessitating a loyal and effective security force. In addition the right to 
tax must be legitimated (that is. sanctioned by. or a part of, the recognized government). Dumnorix1 purchase 
through a bidding system, of the right to collect tolls on the SaGne River indicates his control both sufficien; 
funds for a large capital investment and a foiiowing of armed and mounted men. 
m e  import and export of commerce (intrapolity. interpolity, and internarional) requires 
investment in storage facilities at break-in-bulk points, as well as in boats, wagons, and draft animals. one 
would expect the consolidation of such resources at fords, passes, and break-in-buk nodes of the road network 
(Dowdle 1987). The agents (negotiants) of such enterprises would presumably (by working necessity) be skilled 
in cultural as  well as economic brokerage. 
For most of Gaul, intrapolity commercial production focused on stock-breeding, metal-mining and 
-working operations, other artisanal activities such as enameling and ceramics, and agricultural production. 
Among the Aedui, the breeding of pigs, cattle, sheep, and horses is well documented (Charlesworth 1926; 
Davies 1935; Oaks 1987; MacKendrick 1987). Some metalextraction sites in Aeduan territory are known, as 
well as centers for smelting, plating, and enameling meta1 (Davies 1935; West 1935). Though some of the 
evidence dates to the first century after the Roman conquest, it is relatively safe to assume that on the eve of 
the conquest pottery, figurines, linen (among the Bituriges Cubi), wool, building materials such as timber and 
stone, and perhaps wine (Bituriges Cubi and Aedui) were both regularly exported and distributed locally. Recent 
research in historical linguistics finds many words for tools employed in contemporary French viticulture to be 
of Gaulish origin. 
There is evidence of preconquest agricultural production of wheat and other grains, vegetables, fruits, and 
nuts, as well as fodder and animal products (ham, cheese) in the territory under Aeduan control (Charlesworth 
1926; Davies 1935). Centers sheltering artisans, and environments favoring husbandry and certain kinds of 
agricultural endeavor, are also known (MacKendrick 1987). 
Finally, the ability to provide for the protection of resources and capital and to insure personal safety 
necessitated cavalrymen (armed men and their horses) and defensible fortifications. Further, access to a 
complex network of social, economic, and political ties was mandatory and placed those whose business it was 
to defend the polity in an explicit relation with its entrepreneurs. 
In surn, geopolitical and econornic relations in Gaul in the FIrst century B.C. were firmly rooted in the 
physiognomy of the countryside as it related to the importance of commercial trade. The social and political 
relations were, to a large extent, the predictable outgrowth of resources being exploited at intrapolity, 
interpolity, and international scales. 
SOCIOPOLITICAL RELATIONS IN GAUL ON THE EVE OF THE CONQUEST 
Just as the realities of terrain intruded on Celtic political relations, Celtic social organization stood in a 
dialectical relation to political and economic organization. With specific reference to preconquest Celtic 
society, the t e m  social structure denotes the means by which individual social status was granted, the 
relationship of status to social class, the nature of marital and familial relations, and the means by which strong 
supra-kin bonds were built through political liaisons. 
Elsewhere, in an extensive survey of the documentary evidence for Celtic social structure (Crumley 
19741, I have synopsized what rnight be considered ethnographically correct about the continental Celts as 
judged by a representative group of scholars (Grenier, Holmes, Chadwick, Tierney, and many others) who have 
written in depth on the subject. From this exercise it became ciear to me that certain aspects of Celtic society 
might be spoken of quite confidently (social class, patron-client relations) whereas others (the alleged 
disappearance of kingship, rules of inheritance and of descent) might remain impenetrable if documentary 
evidence alone was employed. 
Our interdisciplinary project in southern Burgundy was begun in part to determine whether a close 
inspection of the physical (both material and spatial) evidence of a particular polity in Celtic society would 
shed light on these disputed areas of Celtic social structure. The condensed discussion that follows is a further 
step toward that end. 
A useful starting point is to distinguish between status (social and political) that is ascribed and status 
that is achieved. Ascribed status in Celtic society was obtained at birth and was dependent upon family 
standing, particular kin relations, gender, and social class. Families were strongly patriarchal (Grenier 1970 
[1945]:191), and wealth was inherited bilaterally (BC 6.19). What is known about inheritance and descent is 
particularly problematic, for much information is gained through literary evidence from the British Isles and is of 
a significantly later date. 
It seems relatively safe to assume the existence of strong clan ties in the earlier continental polities, but 
distinctions in the inheritance status of women are apparent if earlier (BC 6.19) and later (cf. Binchy 1936) 
sources are contrasted. Women did not break ties with their own families on marriage, but continued to interact 
with them socially and politically, a circumstance that may be termed complementary filiation (Fortes 1945). 
Although the early Irish law tracts contain extensive information on the status of Celtic women in 
Christian Ireland, the information is of late date (sixth-seventh centuries A.D.) and difficult to use (but see 
Patterson 1995). One can, however, venture some conservative suggestions: for example, that Celtic women in 
the period before the conquest could hold and inherit property as individuals, but might be expected to 
with (and generally follow the wishes of) their male relatives (both affinal and agnatic) in mY decisions. *ence 
the importance of mamage alliances between families with common or c ~ m p l e m e n t a r ~  intc!rests. 
I have demonstrated (Cmmley 1974) that Celtic social class was undergoing a structural transformation 
at the time of the Roman conquest. Stimulation of the Celtic economy through long-distance trade (particularly 
with Mediterranean groups) had begun to blur class-based distinctions by offering individuals a vari et^ of WaYs 
to power, which at an earlier date only the aristocracy had enjoyed. The complex and enigmatic evidence for an 
earlier institution of kingship, perhaps ~ o c i a t e d  with the priestly class of dmids, invites close textual ana l~s i s  
of classical references to a Celtic aristocracy comprised, at the time of the conquest, of druides and equifes. 
Caesar (BG 6.14) notes that the druids, the more exalted of the two, were exempt from taxation and took 
no pan in warfare. It may be that all young aristocratic Gaulish men took some druidic training; other 
information suggests that an aristocracy existed apart from the more parochial activities of the druids. Certainly 
it would appear that the function of the aristocracy was predominantly administrative. 
Grenier (1970 [1945]:183, 216) suggests that the aristocracy was only a few generations old at the time of 
the conquest and had replaced a system of royalty that had fallen under the pressure of a class whose wealth 
increased through trade with the Mediterranean world; thus more individuals shared in control of the economy, 
and status differentiations were multiplied. Although the origins and functions of Celtic kngship arc h o t l ~  
disputed, the above does remain a plausible explanation for the continued presence of "kings" among the British 
Celts and Celts in Aquitania and Belgica, all areas at the periphery of the most intense Gaulish commerce. 
To whatever we may attribute the disappearance of kingship, certain factions of the aristocracy would 
have found themselves strong enough to abandon higher allegiances. Strabo (4.4.3) reports that the Celts chose a 
magistrate annually, perhaps meaning for all Gaul; Caesar confirnls this (BC 6.13). Much evidence exists (BC 
1.18, 43; 2.1; 5.6, 20, 25; 7.4, 31) that Caesar was aware of the effects of the shift away from kingship and used 
the ensuing instability of rule to his own (and Rome's) advantage whenever possible, without taking a position 
for or against the institution in Gaul (or, some would be tempted to say, in Rome as well). 
Although native social class remained the most basic asset in an individual's rise to power in Gaulish 
politics, by the first century B.C. social class and family ties alone were no longer sufficient to insure a powerful 
position in Gaulish society. Achieved status, specifically the personally controllable means by which one might 
increase status, became central to Gaulish sociopolitical organization. 
The most obvious use of both birth and personal initiative to achieve an enhanced status is through 
marriage with a member of another powerful family. The Aeduan Dumnorix (BG 1.9, 18) married the daughter of 
the Helvetian leader Orgetorix and likewise arranged the marriage of his mother to a powerful citizen of the 
Aeduan client group to the west, the Bituriges Cubi, thus strengthening ties with surrounding polities and 
rivaling his brother Diviciacus' power (1.20) despite the latter's support by Caesar and Rome. 
Personal qualities--generosity, or supreme daring and bravery in battle (1.18)--were also rewarded, for 
they emphasized values respected at all levels of Gaulish society. In addition, bonds of friendship (sometimes 
on the basis of swom oaths, 3.22, 8.33) and hospitality (1.47) cemented both intrapolity and interpolity relations. 
Most important, however, to gaining individual status and prestige was the complex system of Gaulish 
patronage. Although there has been much disagreement in the literature concerning what elements constitute the 
patronclient relation (discussed at length below), for the moment a deflnition in functionai terms will suffice: 
the patron offers economic assistance and protection from legal and illegal authority; in retum the client offers 
demonstrations of esteem, information on the machinations of others, and the promise of politica1 and rnilitary 
support. Apparently both dmids and equites served as patrons of the Gaulish lower class, but members of the 
lower class (Caesar refers to them by the at least loosely equivalent Latin t e m  plebs) were nat necessarily 
always clients; certainly there existed wealthy commoners with followings of their own. 
The institution of clientage was the basis of Celtic political organization. R e  earliest rnentiOn of 
clientship among the continental Celts is by Polybius (Historiae 2.17), who describes the advantages to a 
Gaulish noble of having a number of retainers and clients; Caesar (BG 6.15) also notes mutual advantages. of 
course the institution itself has a lengthy history among many Indo-European peoples: Posidonius identifies a 
similar system among the Thracians, the Germans, and the Aryans of India (Mauss 1926). 
Grenier (1970 [1945]:220) remarks that one cannot exaggerate the importance of clien&hip in e a u l ,  as it 
was the major source of power of such leaders as Orgetorix and Dumnorix. Other systems may have relied 
primarily on the solidarity of the gens (broad descent group); among the Celts the familia of a chieftain, 
relatives and retainers, was of greater importance. The word Polybius uses to describe is 
"brotherhood,' which tempts comparison with modem Sicilian social smcture. In the celt ic example, the 
posited ascendancy of the patronclient relationship led to a more ~ophisticated political organization that cut 
across kin, class, and polity boundaries and that operated at every level of sociery. The power of particularly 
sirong patrons (such as Dumnorix) even rivaled that of the hiehest elected governmental officials (BG 

In 58 B.C. Ariovistus, utilizing these contacts (BG 1.44), offered his clientship (particularly  militar^ 
services) to Rome in retum for control of Gaul. But Caesar insisted that Gaul belonged to Rome and ~ roceeded  
to prove his case to both the Gemans  and the Gauls in subsequent campaigns. 
Amid all the intrapolity, interpoiity, and internatimal rivalries and accords that intensified as Gaul came 
under Roman conquest, only the Arvernian Vercingetorix, by the power of his word and deed, argued for a single 
Gaulish state--"one policy for the whole of Gaul, whose unanimity not even the world could resist" 7.29.6, 
trans. Edwards 19 17). 
In light of the heterogeneity of Celtic politica1 factions, that Vercingetorix came as close as he did to 
achieving a united Gaul is an enduring monument to his vision, remaining unblemished by subsequent events. It 
is worth emphasizing here that although the Celts in Gaul had evidently recognized their geographic 
cultural unity, they had not been nationalized (as the peopies of the Italian peninsula had, some two hundred 
years before) such that the affairs of constituent polities could be peacefully subordinated under a central 
authority (federation, republic, or empire) that would act internationally for the whole. 
We may see, then, among the Aedui theniselves and between the Aeduan and other Gaulish policies, as 
well as Germany and Rome, the flexible power of the patronclient relation, crossing a variety of barriers: kin, 
class, polity, language, and culture. Its existence throughout western Europe and its elasticity at  different scales 
demonstrated, we now turn to a short discussion of the Roman patron-client relation and then to a contextual 
analysis of the Roman and Gaulish forms of that relation in the first century B.C. 
ROMAN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE FIRST CENTURY B.C. 
Roman economic, political, and social relations in the first century B.C. are abundantly documented and 
afford an easy opportunity to compare and contrast the Roman patron-client relation with that of Gaul. Much 
rnay be learned from classical texts and inscriptions, and many eminent nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
historians (e.g., Mommsen 1968; Gelzer 1912; Syme 1939; Badian 1968; Taylor 1966) have addressed the 
subject at length. 
One must of course keep in mind the effect of the rich written tradition in Roman history, which gives the 
illusion of deepening the gap between Rome and Celtic society, whose profoundly oral traditions, now lost, are 
further obscured by the effects of subsequent Roman acculturation. In fact, closer comparative analysis discloses 
many similarities as well as some notable differences (Dunham 1995). 
Sources of individual status and prestige in Roman society may also be described in terms of ascription 
and achievement. Ascribed status for the Roman citizen was obtained at birth and was dependent on family 
standing, kinship, gender, and social class. Indeed the other factors might reasonably be subsumed under the 
category of class, for a hierarchical Roman class structure was well developed by the first century B.C., and 
noble families (patricians) were ranked on the basis of the prestige of their respective ancestors. 
Classes within classes existed among the nobility (Taylor 1966:26). Descent and inheritarlce were 
reckoned bilaterally, but in these great families the individual's social role was determined by gender. Noble 
men were expected to advance rapidly through a ranked succession of political offices; noble women were 
expected to aid their kinsmen (affinal and consanguinial) in that task through advantageous marriage and 
interstitial social and political influence. The knightly class (equites, men with property valued at mare than 
400,000 sesterces), a third class that had evolved between the patricians and the plebs on the basis of wealth 
and (later) political interests, was likewise internally ranked. 
Thus ascribed social class depended first on birth; then status within the class was determined by prestige 
of the family and its wealth and influence. ClasS distinetions could be (and fairly often were) bridged by 
marriage and adoption. The closest bonds between noble houses were established in the same mariner (Taylor 
1966). Adoptions were particuiarly important, as a male individual might thereby augment bis wealth and social 
standing without necessarily involving other family members (Goody 1969). 
After that there remained measures of p ~ r e l y  achieved StatUS: personal political and, indirectly, economic 
success. Political success in public office was closely connected to bonds of friendship between families and to 
the Roman system of patronage. Nobles inherited both friends and enemies and were constantly engaged in 
making advantageous new contacts. They also inherited clients, and groups of friends and clients fomed fie 
basis of the Roman political party system by delivering popular support 
Theoretically, the client entered into the amngement  voluntarily, trusting (in a relationship of fides) the 
patron to interpret the law to him and defend his interests, while the client's responsibility was to serve the 
patron in every way. The Greek historian Dionysus of Halicarnassus (2.9-1 1) provides a detailed discussion of 
Roman patronclient relations and notes that it waS unlawful as well as impious for patron and ,-lient to accuse 
one another in lawsuits or give votes or witness against each other and that whoever was convicted of 
activity was guilty of treason. He also stresses the political importance of the client in the noble's drive for 
political advancement in the cursus-honorum, the prescribed succession of political offices: ideally, quaestor at 
about thirty years of age, praetor nine years lates, then consul three years after that, after which proconsulships 
(provincial governorships) were regularly awarded. Between periods of service in these offices and others, a 
noble was expected to distinguish himself in military service somewhere in the provinces. It was by this means 
that a following of clients and friends at Rome was e ~ ~ h a n u e d  by the allegiance of a loyal and well-tsained 
fighting force, individuals who themselves had been attracted by the hope of land and spoils. 
Thus a noble with a strong family background and widespread ties of friendship and patronage could 
advance rapidly in Roman society of the first century B.C. Julius Caesar is himself an excellent example of 
such an individual, and his campaign in Gaul served to enhance his personal standing as much as to press 
Roman economic interests in western Europe. 
Caesar supplies the classic case of how individual ambition and the goals of an expansionisr state 
coincide to produce a situation where both triumph. While skillfully manipulating patron-client relations within 
Gaulish society (as with the Aedui and the Remi) and winning the ever-increasing loyalty of his army. Caesar 
insured the gracious receipt in Rorne of the news of his victories by securing for his pairia the two ma,jor trade 
routes in western Europe that had remained in Celtic control: the route Srom the Alps to the Rhiine and westward 
toward the Loire, and the north-south route that linked the Atlantic coast and the Rhine with the Rhcne. (See 
Figures A1-A6.) 
Caesar thus returned to Rome with more favors to bcstow and more individuals and factions in  his debt. 
In fact his personal power had been a growing source of dismay to the Senate, who rightlp ioresaw that his 
political rivalry with Pompey (who had been similarly occupied in amassing power on a grand scale) might 
bring down the Republic. 
From Gaul, Caesar crossed the Rubicon into civil war. from which he emesged the first sole ruler of 
Rome in some 450 years. In 44 his assassins, whatcver their own private ambitions for power, nonetheless 
recognized that hierarchical patronage carried to its logical conclusion resulted in autocracy, essentially an 
extension of the kingship whose abolition had been an enduring source of Roman pride. 
Figures Al-A6:  
- Al.  Control of the RhBne corridor, 122 B.C.: Vocontii were subdued in 123, Allobroges arc clients of Arverrli; 
Saluvii and Allobroges are allied. 
- A2. Control of SaBne, Seine, Loire, RhBneLoire corridor, 58 B.C.: Arverni and Sequani purchased German 
intervention in 71 to subdue Aedui; Aedui and Sequani disputed Sahne toll rights in 61, Sequani again usin:: German 
aid to OuSC Aedui; Bellovaci became Aeduan allies ca. 61; now, in 58, Sequani and Helvetii mulually exchange 
hostages, Aedui unilaterally submit hostages to Sequani. 
- A3. "All Belgae were conspiring": control of the Rhine basin (Moselle, Meuse), the CalaisDover channel 
crossing, and the English Channel,  57 B.C.; among the Belgae the Bellovaci are known allies of the Aedui. 
- A4. Control of the English Channel and Atlantic coast toward Spain, 56 B.C.: Roman fleet campaigns against 
Veneti; Crassus subdues Aquitania (Convenae here include several polities named in BG 3.27). 
- A5. Maintaining the CalaisDover crossing, controlling the mouth of the Rhine, 54- 53 B.C. 
- A6 "All Gaul" at Bibracte, 52 B.C.: Aedui begin as allies of Rome, then come under Arvernian, panGaulish 
alliance led by Vercingetorix; Lingones and Remi abstain, Treveri are fighting Germans to the east. 
COMPARISON OF THE TWO STRUCTURED SYSTEMS 
As brielly described carlier,  the rights, duties. privileges, and obligations that a patron-client relationship 
entailed wei.e quite similarly defined in Gaul and Rome: the patron offered economic assistance and protection 
from legal and illegal authority; the client offered demonstrations of es teem,  information on the machinations of 
others, and the promise of political and military support. In both cases  this relation forrned the basis for political 
parties and was fundamental to political organiration in general. 
Personal power, in both instances, was determined by the strength and extent of a loyal following 
(clients.  friends, and retainers) and rhe connections an individual could clairrl i11 lligher ciscles. 30 th  R o ~ n t :  arid 
our Gaulish example,  rhe Aedui, had a republican governmcntal organization with elected officials and laws 
governing succession to office. Both systems had been previously governed by kings (that is, dominance of 
government by a single family through inheritance and succession) ,  the Romans in relatively remote times of 
which they retained a painful memory. the Gaulish polities in the somewhat niore recent past. 
Though both Roman and Gaulish patroncl ient  relations were reflected in their respective legal codes and 
wcre the basis for political parties and personal power, they nonetheless exhibited some substantial differences, 
In Rome patroncl ient  relations were highly formalized; among the Gaulish polities, more diverse. The above 
analysis of the Celtic system has yielded ample indications oí' the right of clients (in certain circumstances) to  
change patrons, and of the fierceness with which this freedom of choice was defended for every class. Although 
vicissitudes in this relationship were known in Roman society a s  well,  they were considered exceptions rather 
than tbe rule (cf. Cicero's support of Pompey, discussed in Taylor 1966:36). 
The lack of strict regulation of  patron-client relations between Celtic polities is clearly indicated by the 
necessity for the transfer of hostages. Ties  of  friendship (equal s ta tus)  between two polities were marked by the 
exchange of hostages (e&. BC 2.1, among thc Belpae);  patron-client ties (unequal s ta tus)  were marked by [he 
transfer to the patron polity of hostages from the client polity (e.g., BC 1.31. from the Aedui to the Sequani) 
(See  Fipure A2). The core concep1 is  one of bonding-bondage of an agseement between parties to insure 
confonnance. 
Another informal aspect  of  Gaulish patroncl ient  relations was the much looser ranking of families and 
individuals, whose status wu subject to change and dispute. This  apparent informality had no close analogue in 
Rome.  where although family status was a subject of great interest, disputes concerning an individualts rnerit 
rarely included challenges to the illustriousness of his or her lineage, thanks to extensive genealogical records 
and scholarship. Perhaps it was a product of the lack of centralized conventions in Gaul. 
The elaborate dmidic oral traditions must likewise have included sophisticated genealogical lore; but 
inter-polity marriages, no1 t o  mention the decline of formal kingship, had over time cncouraged 
interrelationships of  power So complex a s  to be defined almost situationally, both within and between polities. 
Both Cel ts  and Romans might inherit relations of friendship and patronage. but far mare than their ,nore stable 
counterparts. the Celts were constantly obliged to renegotiate relations with friends and clients in  ever-chaneing 
circumstances. L 
Although pauonc l ien t  relations were important a t  every level in both societies in the firs[ centun: B.C., 
the scale  of patron-client relations (that is to say. the highest political and administrative organiLational level at 
which they regularly operated) was predominantly intra- and interpolity in Gaul ,  with incidences of (the druids' Counci l  of all Gaul)  and internarional (e.g.. "Friend oof Rome")  accords. Ronia, whose illtemal politics 
were by this time essentially unified and stable, had extended its patronc1ie:lt system on the national and 
international levels as its provinces and allies accrued and its foreign policy became correspondingly more 
complex. 
Structurally speaking, Gaulish patronclient relations remained, as a result of topography and changing 
economic and social conditions, a predominantly heterarchical form. That is to say, patron-client relations 
sometimes took a hierarchical forn (a patron was in tum a client at a broader scale), buc at another scale 
relations among individuals might be structured heterarchically (on the basis of acknowledged equivalent, but 
not necessarily comparable, sources of power). 
For example, a patron of artisans (e.g., weapon-makers) might be the friend or the client or the patron of 
an individual who had complementary resources at his disposa1 (perhaps an efficient force of armed men, or an 
iron mine). Similarly, individual polities might likewise have complex links with other polities; at all scales, 
shifting needs in the areas of defense and economy, as well as the interference of other nations in the interna1 
affairs of Gaul (e.g., BG 1.44, 5.27, 6.12) were sufficient to keep Gaulish patron-client relations from taking on a 
more formal, hierarchical structure. 
Both the Gaulish and the Roman state may be characterized in this period as resting (despite republican 
sentiments) on a basis of personal power through patronage. In Gaul, patronclient relations facilitated societal 
integration at a macro scale (as with alliances between polities). The personal nature of the patron-client 
relation also facilitated a reassertion of social, economic, and political relations at a more micro scale when the 
empire collapsed some 450 years after Caesar's conquests (Crumley and Marquardt 1987). 
DISCUSSION 
I define elsewhere (Crumley 1979:144; 1987b; 1995b) two types of organizaiional structure pertinent to 
the following analysis: thc hierarchical, in which, on the basis of certain factors, some elements of the structure 
are subordinate to others and may be ranked, and the heterarchical, in which each element possesses the 
potential of being unranked (relative to other elements) or ranked in a number of different ways, depending on 
systemic requirements. 
We may draw from biology a simple example of the distinction: the Linnean classification system of the 
morphology of living organisms is organized hierarchically; but an ecological classification of species in an 
environment is heterarchically organized, such that various species may for a time be attributed equal 
importance as the system's components and parameters are studied, or one species may be designated more 
important than another as the focus of research changes. 
We may argue similarly regarding social structures: an individual's rank in a professional hierarchy, for 
example., may differ markedly from his or her relative status in a religious or community context. The 
individual's severa1 statuses in a variety of roles would thus represent various hierarchies, yet all might prove 
irrelevant in a court of law that upholds a code of uniform civil rights. 
The importance of this concept of heterarchy is that it reminds us that status in many societies is a 
shifting amalgam of ranks (Cancian 1965) whose individual and collective meanings (status) from time to time 
must be renegotiated. Periods of intense renegotiation predictably occur when the economy is stimulated and 
new opportunities for capital investment arise. "Wew money" Suels new investments, which further consolidate 
new status. 
Thus the econonly is doubly fed: both personal and corporate investments must be made wisely in order 
to maintain, consolidate, and enhance status. Astute decision-making ability (an acquircd quality, one assumes, 
distributed more or less randomly throughout the population) and the informed ranking of priorities (which 
assumes access to accurate informatim)--and not the ascribed characteristics of class, family, or gender-- 
become paths to power, and politization is complete. 
A key element is the patron-client relation: a workforce wishing to see its individual (or collective) 
well-being assured (clients), focuses infornlation in the hands of certain individuals (patrons), which facilitates 
the turning of resources into profits. In this context Caesar's argument that the Celtic lower classes were 
universally destitute and oppressed must be questioned not only on the basis of their freedom to change patrons 
and withhold compliance but on socioeconomic grounds as well. 
It may well be that there were two types of clients: those who served through clear perception of mutual 
interests (ambacti, soldurii) and others who were financially in a patron's debt (cf. BG 6.13-15). While yielding 
the point made in BC, I nonetheless find it difficult to envision very many circumstances in which mutual 
interests would not be ultimateiy financial. 
Frorn the above, as well as a single comment in BG 7.14, I argue that most Aeduans in the first century 
B.C. held property in private. Certain groups (e.g., artisans) may have held their capital in jewelry and stocks of 
their own rnerchandise more frequently than others whose wealth was derived frorn landholdings. 
Patriarchal descent and primogeniture would have kept landholdings in a descent group, and double 
inheritance would have assured women access to capital in the form of belongings and occasionally (as in the 
case of female only children) in land, although it is likely that men held and disposed of land more frequendy 
than women. Mamages between families providing access to both land and capital would have been propitious 
indeed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The factors influencing shifts in effective scale of patron-client relations during the past two thousand 
years, along with the shifting patterns of population agglomeration and dispersion, and of boundary m a i n t ~ ~ a n c e  
and dissolution, are the subject of over two decades of investigation by our research group in southern Burgund~,  
once the heartland of the Celtic Aedui. An important piece of missing information in the construction of a model 
of first-century B.C. settlement and land use is the nature of Celtic rules of descent and inheritance practices, 
although careful work on the Irish texts may be able to remedy this situation (Patterson 1995). 
The present analysis of Aeduan geo- and sociopolitical organization in the period just before the Roman 
conquest has enabled us to deduce certain rules of descent and inheritance and to identify certain priorities, thus 
illuminating the decision-making process. Economic and social success would be measured in terms of 
increased access to resources. 
Indebtedness would mark the failure of a portion of the population to rank priorities effectively or to forn 
mutually beneficial liaisons, and would have been due to a variety of factors. Political, social, economic, and 
climatic instability would have required the borrowing of capital, although the influence of those factors would 
have been felt differentially. For exarnple, a highland mixed agriculturalist would have been less affected by a 
drought than a midlands grain or cattle farmer whose investments were in a few areas sensitive to climatic 
instability. To bring the best price, a metalworker with a specialty in enameling might have found it necessary 
to se11 his goods with others' en gros through a patron: another metalsmith might have followed an itinerant 
route from f a m  to farm, repairing metal weapons and tools. The social, political, and economic bargains struck 
with other, more powerful members of the society would have reflected each individual's situation (skills, 
circumstances of birth, etc.) and personal ranking of priorities within that existing framework. 
The foregoing analysis facilitates informed speculation about where the holdings of certain classes of 
Aeduan society (as well as those af  specific individuals) might be found, (Crumley 1987c, note 2) relating 
social class to the landscape of the Aeduan polity. Too often we envision prehistoric and historic settlernent as 
rnonolithic--a single interlocking form, a hierarchical spatial representation to conform to our (also frequently 
erroneous) notions of a rigid social hierarchy. All about us today we have abundant evidence to the contrary: 
periods of rapid change invariably produce a variety of responses in all facets of society, not the least of which 
is the novel use of space (Crumley 1987c, 1993. 1994). 
The central importance of the patronclient relation in preconquest Gaul has been demonstrated. There is 
evidence pointing to its structural transformation from informal, heterarchical in the Iran Age, to informal, 
hierarchical under Roman influence in the Gallo-Roman period, to formal. hierarchical in the manorial context 
(Berry 1987). 
From Gaul in the first century B.C. to Merovingian France. the effective scale (the scale at which certain 
features forn a recognizably homogeneous unit) of patronclient relations fluctuates over time from local and 
regional to national and international and back to regional and local, in response to the fortunes of war and of 
longdistance trade. 
A final point must be made: in preconquest Gaul any status gained in the socioeconomic realm could be 
rendered irrelevant in the face of the power of the druids. Masters of information both secular and sacred (BG 
6.20) and venerated by all, they served as social. political, and religious arbiters. Through their decisions, they 
focused [he energies and abilities of the Cel@ on service to [he mystic forces of [he universe, in retun, for *e 
imrnortality of the soul. 
It is unsurprising that the druids posed a threat SO profound that the Roman state moved to suppress their 
activities; the druids saw all too clearly that the power of the spring and the grove were to be supplanted by the 
lures of the marketplace and the scratch of the accountant's pen. 
APPENDIX: GAULISH DEFENSE OF TRADE ROUTES DURING THE CONQUEST 
The route to Spain and to the Atlantic through Aquitania had been secured for Rome in 121 B.C., with the 
establishment of the Provincia Narbonensis along the south coast of Gaul. The proposed emigration of the 
Helvetii in 58 B.C. posed a dual threat to that asset. They originally planned to take the route westward through 
the Roman province; this Caesar firmly refused them, as too dangerous to interna1 stability (BG 1.6-7). 
The alternate, more northem itinerary through independent Gaulish territories promised widespread unrest 
that might threaten the security of the province from without (BG 1.10). This latter road was part of rhe great 
route that ran from the Alps to the Rhbne and westward. Indeed the subdued Ailobroges along the lower Rhbne 
had become restless, and the Aedui, Sequani, and Helvetii threatened to ally to close the upper Rhane (and 
hence the heart of Europe) to Roman trade (Figure A2). 
That threat was removed for the moment with Caesar's liquidation of the Helvetii, though a force sent by 
Caesar to protect the passage from the Rhone to the Alps was obliged to retreat after heavy tlghting with other 
mountain tribes (BC 3.1-6). In 57 (BC 2) the polities of the western Rhine basin attempted to maintain Celtic 
(more precisely, Belgic) control of the Rhine and its western tributaries (Figure A3), and in 56 (BG 3.7-19) the 
northern coastal polities attempted to maintain control of the English Channel and North Sea trade routes 
(Figure A4). 
Both groups of Gaulish alliances--the eastcentral and the northern and coastal--met with failure at the 
hands of the Roman armies, but British Celts offered more effective resistance in 56 and 55, because of 
Caesar's overextended supply lines and the difficulty of adapting Roman forces to local battle conditions (BC 
4.20-35, 5.1-23). It was not unti1 52 (BG 7) that Gaul, under Vercingetorix. was able to make a united stand 
against widespread Roman control of European trade (Figure A6), and by then it was too late. 
Political boundaries shown in Figures Al-A6 are drawn from Lognon (1885; cf. Crumley 1974). In each 
figure, polities shaded in as alliances are mentioned specifically as such by Caesar in De Bello Callico, which 
is arranged by yearly campaigns. It can be assumed that adjacent and outlying polities were involved to a 
greater or lesser extent through patron-client obligations. 
Carole L. Crumle?.. Departntent o f  Anthropology. Universiv nf North Carolina. Chapel Hill, NC 27599-31 15 USA 
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